The first part of your argument could have been true, were it not for the fact that our world is not that multi polar at all. The United States is the number one world power by far, which is why they get away with such immensely aggressive foreign policy.
The US is the number one world power in terms of economic and military might, sure, but does that mean that the world is not multi-polar? No it doesn't. There are numerous nations that have been exploiting their strategic power overseas for either mutual or solo gains, including but not limited to China, Russia, France, Spain, the United Kingdom, Iran, Israel, Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia, both Koreas, South Africa, Ethiopia, Uganda, Brazil and Turkey. The US is certainly the dominant power
in the strategic landscape, but it is neither powerful not interventionist enough to dominate
it. I mean, various institutions such as the EU's Institute for Security Studies
base their publications on the presumption of a multipolar world, and the fact I've not seen or read anything recently that suggests there's still an an existing widely-held belief amongst strategic theorists that the geostrategic landscape is dominated solely by the US as a single great power.
You've really gotten hold of the problem there, because the united states is the number one world power, and is also a business led tyranny which has a fundamental lack of politically active citizens. I think that it's great that we have international law that is able to hold states responsible for their improper aggression. If the number one world power would start respecting it it would be a step towards a safer and more peaceful world.
Let's take a step back here. Do I agree that the United States is the number one world power? Yes. Does that mean that they have an ability to further their interests through force without a reliance on consensus amongst the international community? Yes, but they aren't the only nation who have the power to do this. Since the end of the Cold War we've seen questionable military escalation without punitive recompense from Russia in Georgia and the North Caucus, including numerous claims of war crimes committed by Russian forces. We've seen China militarise their completely untenable and illogical stand on the Spratley Islands; we've seen the Iranian state using foreign militant groups as a de-facto army during various crises in the Middle East and Gulf; we've seen Ethiopia in particular over-extend in Somalia, moving from peacekeeping to direct influence through military power; we've seen numerous instances of illegal operations being conducted against sovereign foreign nations such as the Ugandan military incursions into the DRC; both Peru and Ecuador in the Cenepa War, et cetera et cetera. I agree wholeheartedly with the lack of political participation in the United States and the questions that arise in terms of accountability for actions from that, but the same could be effectively said of a huge number of nations and it isn't entirely true to imply that the US systematically engages in conflicts for which there is limited public support. Participates in, yes; engages in, no. The incursion into Syria, should it come, is likely to be rather exceptional in this context. I'd also argue that the US has become less strategically involved since the end of the Cold War and actually de-escalated to a great extent, but that's by the by.
And I did not misrepresent anything. By condoning the United States being an outlaw state and invading Syria without respect for international law you judged it as being moral
Actually if you read back you'll realise I never condoned the actions of the US or directly inferred support for the support of military operations without a UN consensus. I merely explained the methods through which the US can and does use this power, and highlighted that they're far from the only power who acts in such a way.
I'll post it again...There's nothing vague about this.
You seem to be misunderstanding the point I'm making. The very existence of caveats for national defence is precisely the method through which the ambiguity arises. Nowhere is there a "hard and fast" set of rules for what constitutes self-defence in the international community. In fact, the case law on the issue is extraordinarily contradictory. At different times and under different circumstances, military actions defend friendly but non-allied states, pre-emptive military strikes, mutual defence involving disparate powers, defence of foreign strategic interests, unilateral military action with no clear self-defence rationale and a whole host of other circumstances have been found both legal and illegal. So my point still stands- there is effectively no rulebook as to what constitutes a legitimate self-defence argument, therefore it is solely up to the subjective whims of the ICJ to determine whether such an argument is valid.
So what is illegal is based on the consensus of the 'international community' (code for the United States and it's allies)? I'll keep my definition of illegal as 'against the law' in stead of 'condemned by the United States and it's allies'.
Yes. It's a statement of fact that the actions of states can only be categorised as illegal on the basis of international consent. You're welcome to continue using your own definition for it, but it doesn't really bring anything to the table or contribute to your argument in any way; it is the equivalent of claiming that certain actions violate certain amendment of the US Constitution- you can claim they do all they want, but as an individual who lacks the authority to make the judgement (the legislature applicable in either case being the authority), it's merely an opinion.
Well, how I see it, one army kills thousands of people in a war from one ethnic group, does not openly admit it was ethnic cleansing. Genocide. Other group, (US army), does the same thing. Not genocide. The problem with intensions is that they are hidden.. And considering intensions are hidden in both cases, and considering both have death counts that pale with common examples of genocide, I find it inappropriate to name them as such.
I don't think there's a great deal of logic in trying to redefine the meaning of words so they suit your argument. How you see it is largely immaterial; without evidence to say that there was an organised plot inside the military coalitions to systematically destroy any racial, national or religious group in Iraq or Afghanistan, your claim is completely meaningless. It's also ignorant to the point of offence in regard to the conflict in Bosnia, so much so that I have great difficulty in taking the rest of the comment seriously. Also, there's nothing to say an act of genocide necessarily has to have a particularly large body count. There were acts of genocide committed by both sides during the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-22 such as the burning of Smyrna which had casualty figures in the hundreds or thousands.
Rich Hutu's could become Tutsi's and poor Tutsi's could become Hutu's...Making the differences between these two groups static was a major cause of the genocide.
The difference already existed. The Bantu- from which the societal elites (Tutsis) were almost entirely formed before and during the Colonial period, and from which the monarchical system was derived- were effectively foreign invaders, and tensions between Tutsi and Hutu had formed well before the Colonial period in the 1880s- under the reign of the Mwambi, the Tutsis controlled the entire power base.